Tsambo
Μέλος
- Εγγρ.
- 26 Απρ 2008
- Μηνύματα
- 5.195
- Κριτικές
- 1
- Like
- 5
- Πόντοι
- 66
Ειπαμε να μη γραφουμε οτι να'ναι γιατι στο τελος δε μπορεις να ξεχωρισεις τον σκεπτομενο απο τον καμμενο με συνομωσιες, εξωγηινους, υπεροπλα, ομαδα Ε, ξανθο γενος και τα ρεστα...
Frontline: Could you elaborate on the point about mixed signals sent by the U.S. during the run-up to the invasion of Kuwait? How did those influence your government's decision?
Tariq Aziz: There were no mixed signals. We should not forget that the whole period before August 2 witnessed a negative American policy towards Iraq. So it would be quite foolish to think that, if we go to Kuwait, then America would like that. Because the American tendency . . . was to untie Iraq. So how could we imagine that such a step was going to be appreciated by the Americans? It looks foolish, you see, this is fiction. About the meeting with April Glaspie--it was a routine meeting. There was nothing extraordinary in it. She didn't say anything extraordinary beyond what any professional diplomat would say without previous instructions from his government. She did not ask for an audience with the president. She was summoned by the president. He telephoned me and said, "Bring the American ambassador. I want to see her." She was not prepared, because it was not morning in Washington. People in Washington were asleep, so she needed a half-hour to contact anybody in Washington and seek instructions. So, what she said were routine, classical comments on what the president was asking her to convey to President Bush. He wanted her to carry a message to George Bush--not to receive a message through her from Washington.
Frontline: Why was the decision made by your government to move into Kuwait? What did you hope to achieve, and were you surprised by the American response?
Tariq Aziz: Kuwait was never in our plans during all our leadership of this country. . . But we had to do it as a defensive act. Kuwait was conspiring against us.
Glaspie's cable was declassified after a Freedom of Information Act appeal by the National Security Archive at George Washington University. The cable, along with others obtained by the archive, suggests that she was largely carrying out a policy, pushed by State at the time, of seeking to improve relations with Iraq.
Glaspie's cable says that President George H.W. Bush "had instructed her to broaden and deepen our relations with Iraq," adding that Hussein in turn offered "warm greetings" to Bush and was "surely sincere" about not wanting war.
In the interview, Glaspie recalls that her meeting with Hussein was interrupted when the Iraqi president received a phone call from Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Hussein told her he had assured Mubarak that he would try to settle the dispute, she said. Her cable backs up this version of events, though the Iraqi transcript has Hussein saying that Mubarak called before he met with Glaspie.
Glaspie said the Mubarak call was crucial in convincing her that any sense of crisis had passed. She said that she was "foolish" to believe that Hussein would not lie to both her and Mubarak, and that she left Baghdad to go on a short vacation. Before she left, she sent another cable titled "Iraq Blinks -- Provisionally," also obtained by the archive.
Και η "αντιθετη" αποψη απο τον Stephen M. Walt:
The more interesting question — and the one that concerned us when we wrote our original 2003 article — was what that meeting tells us about Saddam’s calculations. I think the recently released cable describing that meeting is consistent with our interpretation. Saddam is clearly aggrieved, and most of Glaspie’s responses are attempts to mollify him. Nowhere in this cable is there evidence of a clear deterrent warning, or an unambiguous statement of an American security guarantee to Kuwait. She reminds Saddam that we have concerns about his intentions — which was clearly not news to Saddam — but there’s not even a hint from her of what Washington would do if he seized Kuwait.
Even Glaspie’s statement that President Bush is deeply interested in peace and stability in the Gulf can be read as something of a green light. If the president says he wants closer relations with Iraq but doesn’t want war in the Gulf, might Saddam have seen that as suggesting that the United States wasn’t about to fight to preserve Kuwaiti sovereignty? Remember: Saddam wasn’t intending to fight a major war against Kuwait; he was just planning a coup de main. Based on Glaspie’s remarks, he might easily has concluded that Washignton would ultimately acquiesce-however reluctantly — to his fait accompli.
In short, I think it is clear from the cable that the United States did unwittingly give a green light to Saddam, and certainly no more than a barely flickering yellow light. Glaspie certainly didn’t make it clear to him what would happen if he used force against Kuwait. This is a case of policy failure but not deterrence failure, in short, because deterrence wasn’t tried in this case.
Το cable που αναφερονται παραπανω: Ομοιως σε text:
Περιληψη της συναντησης απο τη σκοπια του Tariq Aziz, δημοσιευμενη μολις 2 μηνες αργοτερα, κατα τη διαρκεια του πολεμου:
Ειναι σαφες οτι δε μιλαμε σε καμια περιπτωση για συνειδητο πρασινο φως και "παγιδα" προς τους Ιρακινους κλπ. Μονο για ανικανοτητα απο τη μια και μεγαλομανια απο την αλλη.
