Εδώ βλέπω ότι απο το 1973 μέχρι το 1982 καταστράφηκαν με γνήσιο Σικάγο και μετά κάνανε στροφή στον πραγματισμό και στην ρύθμιση και σωθήκανε.
Besides the Petrodollar recycling and the 1979 energy crisis there were some specific Chilean reasons for the crises too. The Chicago Boys had expected that since the government had achieved a fiscal surplus and the decision for external borrowing was left to private agents a foreign exchange crises would not occur. But in an effort to fight inflation Dollarization was introduced which lead to a Peso revaluation that caused high current account deficits which led to an increase in foreign lending. Additionally capital controls were abandoned and the financial market deregulated which led to an undamped increase in private foreign borrowing.[115] The debt crises led to a bank run which led to an economic crises.
With the economic crisis of 1982, the "monetarist experiment" came to be widely regarded as a failure.[116][117][118][119]
Pragmatic “Neoliberalism” (1982–90)
Finance minister Sergio de Castro rejected a competitive devaluation of the Peso even in 1982 despite a quickly growing rate of business bankruptcies. He argued that only the strongest and fittest should survive. But with a deepening financial and economic crises that position became unbearable. He had to resign.[120] One by one the economic crises of 1981 led to the replacement of all the Chicago Boys.[121] Pragmatic economists had to socialize the two biggest Chilean banks in 1982 and another seven collapsing banks in 1983. The Central Bank of Chile socialized much of the foreign debt.[122] The public expenditure quota rose above 34%, even higher than during the presidency of socialist Salvador Allende. Critics mocked the situation as the "Chicago way to socialism".[123]
The pragmatic Chicago Boy Hernán Büchi was appointed as finance minister in 1985. He revived Bank regulation by founding the Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras (SBIF) and established capital controls to avoid another financial crises. He also established ProChile, a Chilean government agency specialized in the promotion of exports.[124] A further promotion of exports were fostered by cheap government credit and subsidies. Some tariffs were raised up to 35%. The socialized banks and some profitable public companies were (re-)privatized.[124]
The pragmatic economic policy after the crises of 1982 is appreciated for bringing constant economic growth.[125] It is questionable whether the radical reforms of the Chicago boys contributed to the past 1983 growth.[126]
Evaluation
The percentage of Chilean population living in poverty had doubled from 1973 to 1990. According to Ricardo Ffrench-Davis the unnecessary radicalism of the in the 1970s caused mass unemployment, purchasing power losses, extreme inequalities in the distribution of income and severe socio-economic damage.[127] He argues that the 1982 crises as well as the success of the pragmatic economic policy after 1982 proves that the 1973-1981 radical economic policy of the Chicago boys harmed the Chilean economy.
