Πέθανε ο πρώην πρωθυπουργός Κώστας Σημίτης

[Dstrict]

Το επώνυμο του δεν σου λέει τίποτα;
Δεν είναι "Σιμίτης"όπως το κουλούρι αλλά "Σημίτης" λόγω καταγωγής η έστω λόγω παρατσουκλιου που με την πάροδο του χρόνου επικράτησε.

Σημασία έχει ότι έκανε τον Κινέζο

 

[sex volcano]

Σάς έκανε Ευρωπαίους απο .....καραβλαχους

Ο μπαμπας σας

 

[DAMDIM100]

 

[Dstrict]

Και φυσικά και το μετρό αυτό ουσιαστικά απέτυχε γιατί η υπόθεση εγινε:
Σαφάρι για ανασφαλιστα οχήματα
Πρόστιμα σοκ για τα ανασφαλιστα οχήματα
Ξεκινούν οι ηλεκτρονικές διασταυρωσεις για τα ανσφαλιστα

Μπορεί να απέτυχε παροδικά αλλά έθεσε τα θεμέλια για σκληρότερες φορολογήσεις που ήρθαν αργότερα ή και σκοπεύουν να έρθουν ακόμα αργότερα και είναι λίγο πολύ οριζόντιες, i.e. ούτε για την "πλουτοκρατία"ειδικώς ούτε για "έχοντες κατέχοντες"
γενικώς.

Εκεί που εστιάζω είναι στη γλώσσα που χρησιμοποιούν οι πολιτικοί ως φορείς ή απλοί διακομιστές αλλά όπως είπα προηγουμένως,ας είναι.

 

[nickpie2008]

Μπορεί να απέτυχε παροδικά αλλά έθεσε τα θεμέλια για σκληρότερες φορολογήσεις που ήρθαν αργότερα ή και σκοπεύουν να έρθουν ακόμα αργότερα και είναι λίγο πολύ οριζόντιες, i.e. ούτε για την "πλουτοκρατία"ειδικώς ούτε για "έχοντες κατέχοντες"
γενικώς.

Εκεί που εστιάζω είναι στη γλώσσα που χρησιμοποιούν οι πολιτικοί ως φορείς ή απλοί διακομιστές αλλά όπως είπα προηγουμένως,ας είναι.

Στην "συλληψη" του ο νόμος αυτός ήταν ότι πιο προοδευτικό έχει αποφασιστεί ποτέ στην Ελλάδα με ποσοστά πραγματικά "δικαια"

Δυστυχώς για εμένα το μεγαλύτερο αρνητικό του Σημίτη ήταν πως δεν προχώρησε τον εκσυγχρονισμο και μεταρρυθμισεις που ειναι αναγκαιες και ακομα και τωρα αυτες κωλωνουν ολοι να κανουν και φυσικα πληρωνουμε απο τοτε

 

[resp]

Μεγάλο σκουπίδι.
Τι να πρωτοθυμηθούμε από το "μεγαλείο" του;
Ίμια; Μαδρίτη; Ελσίνκι; S-300; Ενιαίο Αμυντικό Δόγμα;
Χρηματιστήριο; Ολυμπιακούς; Κόκκαλη; Μπόμπολα; Μαθηματικό τύπο; Έρευνα των Γερμανών για μίζες; Τσουκάτο;
Βρώμα και δυσωδία ο πολιτικός του βίος.
Διόλου τυχαίο που ο Μητσοτάκης αποφάσισε εθνικό πένθος και κηδεία δημοσία δαπανη.
Της ίδιας κλάσης είναι κι αυτός, τα ίδια βήματα ακολουθεί.

 

[riding]

Η σημερινή μέρα γιορτάστηκε στον Βόλο με 14000 φαναράκια να ιπτανται στον ουρανό!

 

[forest]

Ωραίος τύπος μας έβαλε στο ευρώ με μαγειρεμένα στοιχεία, είχε αριστερά και δεξιά του μια συμμορία που με πρόφαση των σοσιαλισμό εξαπατουσαν και έκλεβαν τους πολίτες ευχαρίστησε τους Αμερικανούς έδωσε των Οτσαλάν και πολλά άλλα καλο ψόφο.

 

[Dstrict]

Μεγάλο σκουπίδι.
Τι να πρωτοθυμηθούμε από το "μεγαλείο" του;
Ίμια; Μαδρίτη; Ελσίνκι; S-300; Ενιαίο Αμυντικό Δόγμα;
Χρηματιστήριο; Ολυμπιακούς; Κόκκαλη; Μπόμπολα; Μαθηματικό τύπο; Έρευνα των Γερμανών για μίζες; Τσουκάτο;
Βρώμα και δυσωδία ο πολιτικός του βίος.
Διόλου τυχαίο που ο Μητσοτάκης αποφάσισε εθνικό πένθος και κηδεία δημοσία δαπανη.
Της ίδιας κλάσης είναι κι αυτός, τα ίδια βήματα ακολουθεί.

Απλά να προσθέσω την ίδια "δημοσία δαπάνη" που αρνήθηκε κάπου κάποτε δυό χρόνια πριν.
@athinaios44

 

[Han Psolo]

μετά απο τόση στήριξη λογικό το ότι κήρυξε 4ημερο Εθνικό πένθος ο νεοΣημίτης WOKούλης

 

[Dstrict]

Στην "συλληψη" του ο νόμος αυτός ήταν ότι πιο προοδευτικό έχει αποφασιστεί ποτέ στην Ελλάδα με ποσοστά πραγματικά "δικαια"

Δυστυχώς για εμένα το μεγαλύτερο αρνητικό του Σημίτη ήταν πως δεν προχώρησε τον εκσυγχρονισμο και μεταρρυθμισεις που ειναι αναγκαιες και ακομα και τωρα αυτες κωλωνουν ολοι να κανουν και φυσικα πληρωνουμε απο τοτε

Απλά είναι εκσυγχρονιστές όσο ο όρος είναι πιασάρικος και το πολύ πολύ να φάνε κανά δυο τρία απ' τα "παιδιά" τους αλλά ποτέ δεν θα πυροβολήσουν τα ίδια τους τα πόδια...

 

[Κώστας Λαδάκης]

Περιμένω να μας περιγράψει κάποιος τα πλαστά στοιχεία εισόδου στην ΟΝΕ

Δεκέμβριος 2005

και

How 'magic' made Greek debt disappear before it joined the euro

Greece distorted its government debt and budget deficit figures to comply with the Maastricht criteria and join the euro, Allan Little reports.

www.bbc.com

How 'magic' made Greek debt disappear before it joined the euro​

3 February 2012

Greece is at the heart of the ongoing eurozone crisis, but is past sleight of hand by Greek statisticians to blame for the country's current financial meltdown?
"We used to call him the magician, because he could make everything disappear.
"He made inflation disappear. And then he made the deficit disappear," recalls Greek economist Miranda Xafa.
In the 1990s Miranda Xafa was working for an investment house in London, watching from a distance, as her native Greece got ready for membership of the euro.
She knew - and advised her clients - that the country's economy was not ready, that the statistics its government was publishing did not reflect reality.
"I used to come to Athens from London, with clients of Salomon Brothers," she tells me.
"We always saw the head of the statistical agency of Greece, who compiled all the statistics on the debt, the deficit and so on."
He was "the magician" who made inflation and the deficit "disappear".
The new fiscal treaty that 25 of the 27 EU member states agreed to this week is meant to ensure that in future no country has a budget deficit of greater than 3% of GDP.
That same 3% rule was first enshrined in 1992, in the Maastricht Treaty, which led to the creation of the euro in the first place.
But some countries did not respect it. In the case of Greece, not even from the beginning. Greece cooked the books to join the euro in the first place.

Deception becomes transparent​

So how did this 'magic' work?
"Take the Greek state railway. It was losing a billion euros a year," Ms Xafa remembers.
"The Greek railway had more employees than passengers. A former minister, Stefanos Manos, had said publicly at the time that it would be cheaper to send everyone by taxi."
The authorities used a neat conjuring trick to make the problem vanish.
"The [railway] company would issue shares that the government would buy. So it was counted not as expenditure, but as a financial transaction."
And it did not appear on the budget balance sheet.
So Greece fulfilled the Maastricht criteria and was admitted to the eurozone on January 1, 2001 - but by 2004 the deception was becoming transparent.
That year a new, centre-right government was elected. Peter Doukas was appointed budget minister.
"I invited the senior staff of the ministry and asked them to give me details of the budget that had been passed the previous December, two-and-a-half months before we took office.
"I said 'don't worry about persecution or anything, just tell me the true story'."
The difference between the published deficit and the real one was huge.
"[The gap] was about 7% of GDP," Mr Doukas says.
"The budget said the deficit was 1.5%. The real shortfall was 8.3%."
So what did Mr Doukas do about it, given the eurozone's Maastricht treaty rule to keep budget deficits below 3% of GDP?
"I said it's an alarming situation and that we should start chopping down the budget," he recalls.
"But the answer I got at the time was 'listen, we are having the Olympic Games in a few months and we cannot upset the whole population and start having strikes and everything just before the Olympic Games'."

Germany 'sinned'​

Instead of reforming public finances, Greece borrowed and borrowed to meet the deficit. Banks queued up to lend.
The markets did not believe there was a risk of default because Greece's currency, the euro, was locked into that of Germany.

So Greece could borrow cheaply, at very low interest rates. It got credit on the same conditions, more or less, as Germany.
The so-called "spreads" - the differences in the rates at which sound and unsound economies could borrow - seemed to have disappeared.
Suddenly, in this one very narrow respect, every country was Germany.
That had not been part of the plan, says Dietrich Von Kyaw, who was Germany's ambassador to the EU in the 1990s.
"We didn't understand or foresee that due to this wonderfully successful-appearing monetary union everybody would get similar conditions as Germany would.
"Now we have these enormous spreads again as they were before monetary union," he says, "but for too long they didn't really come into play."
The markets failed to see the debt mountains that were accumulating. And they underestimated the risk.
Alongside the 3% of GDP budget deficit limit, eurozone members were also obliged to keep their overall debt to less than 60% of GDP.
They had signed up to a mechanism called the Stability and Growth Pact whereby governments could be fined for breaching the limits.
However, France and Germany broke the very rules that they had insisted on for everyone else.
Germany, the great European financial disciplinarian, was struggling because the cost of reunification with the former East Germany had left a big hole in its budget.
Mr Von Kyaw admits that Germany's government "really sinned".
Well, "not a real sin" he adds - Germany just "flexibilised the schedules."
"But when a big country does that, how can you afterwards impose on smaller countries, including Greece, to obey the rules?" he concedes.
And that affected the way Greece viewed the consequences of breaking the rules.
"There was pressure," says Peter Doukas, "but not the sort of thing that is breathing down your neck.
"Everyone who could read the numbers could see that the numbers are off. Even if you allow for constructive accounting, or whatever."
In fact the Stability and Growth Pact was as good as dead by the time Mr Doukas took office in 2004.
So the lesson of history is that the real challenge for the new treaty will come if any of the big nations break the rules in the future.
Allan Little presents part two of Europe's Choice on BBC Radio 4 on Sunday, 5 February at 13:30 GMT.
You can listen again to whole series via the Radio 4 website or by downloading the Crossing Continents podcast.

 

[DAMDIM100]

Περιμένω να μας περιγράψει κάποιος τα πλαστά στοιχεία εισόδου στην ΟΝΕ

Το λένε "δημιουργική" λογιστική εθνικών λογαριασμών... Κυκλοφορεί και η παραλλαγή της για ιδιωτικές και δημόσιες επιχειρήσεις...

 

[Balkan cowboy]

Δεκέμβριος 2005

και

How 'magic' made Greek debt disappear before it joined the euro

Greece distorted its government debt and budget deficit figures to comply with the Maastricht criteria and join the euro, Allan Little reports.

www.bbc.com

How 'magic' made Greek debt disappear before it joined the euro​

3 February 2012

Greece is at the heart of the ongoing eurozone crisis, but is past sleight of hand by Greek statisticians to blame for the country's current financial meltdown?
"We used to call him the magician, because he could make everything disappear.
"He made inflation disappear. And then he made the deficit disappear," recalls Greek economist Miranda Xafa.
In the 1990s Miranda Xafa was working for an investment house in London, watching from a distance, as her native Greece got ready for membership of the euro.
She knew - and advised her clients - that the country's economy was not ready, that the statistics its government was publishing did not reflect reality.
"I used to come to Athens from London, with clients of Salomon Brothers," she tells me.
"We always saw the head of the statistical agency of Greece, who compiled all the statistics on the debt, the deficit and so on."
He was "the magician" who made inflation and the deficit "disappear".
The new fiscal treaty that 25 of the 27 EU member states agreed to this week is meant to ensure that in future no country has a budget deficit of greater than 3% of GDP.
That same 3% rule was first enshrined in 1992, in the Maastricht Treaty, which led to the creation of the euro in the first place.
But some countries did not respect it. In the case of Greece, not even from the beginning. Greece cooked the books to join the euro in the first place.

Deception becomes transparent​

So how did this 'magic' work?
"Take the Greek state railway. It was losing a billion euros a year," Ms Xafa remembers.
"The Greek railway had more employees than passengers. A former minister, Stefanos Manos, had said publicly at the time that it would be cheaper to send everyone by taxi."
The authorities used a neat conjuring trick to make the problem vanish.
"The [railway] company would issue shares that the government would buy. So it was counted not as expenditure, but as a financial transaction."
And it did not appear on the budget balance sheet.
So Greece fulfilled the Maastricht criteria and was admitted to the eurozone on January 1, 2001 - but by 2004 the deception was becoming transparent.
That year a new, centre-right government was elected. Peter Doukas was appointed budget minister.
"I invited the senior staff of the ministry and asked them to give me details of the budget that had been passed the previous December, two-and-a-half months before we took office.
"I said 'don't worry about persecution or anything, just tell me the true story'."
The difference between the published deficit and the real one was huge.
"[The gap] was about 7% of GDP," Mr Doukas says.
"The budget said the deficit was 1.5%. The real shortfall was 8.3%."
So what did Mr Doukas do about it, given the eurozone's Maastricht treaty rule to keep budget deficits below 3% of GDP?
"I said it's an alarming situation and that we should start chopping down the budget," he recalls.
"But the answer I got at the time was 'listen, we are having the Olympic Games in a few months and we cannot upset the whole population and start having strikes and everything just before the Olympic Games'."

Germany 'sinned'​

Instead of reforming public finances, Greece borrowed and borrowed to meet the deficit. Banks queued up to lend.
The markets did not believe there was a risk of default because Greece's currency, the euro, was locked into that of Germany.

So Greece could borrow cheaply, at very low interest rates. It got credit on the same conditions, more or less, as Germany.
The so-called "spreads" - the differences in the rates at which sound and unsound economies could borrow - seemed to have disappeared.
Suddenly, in this one very narrow respect, every country was Germany.
That had not been part of the plan, says Dietrich Von Kyaw, who was Germany's ambassador to the EU in the 1990s.
"We didn't understand or foresee that due to this wonderfully successful-appearing monetary union everybody would get similar conditions as Germany would.
"Now we have these enormous spreads again as they were before monetary union," he says, "but for too long they didn't really come into play."
The markets failed to see the debt mountains that were accumulating. And they underestimated the risk.
Alongside the 3% of GDP budget deficit limit, eurozone members were also obliged to keep their overall debt to less than 60% of GDP.
They had signed up to a mechanism called the Stability and Growth Pact whereby governments could be fined for breaching the limits.
However, France and Germany broke the very rules that they had insisted on for everyone else.
Germany, the great European financial disciplinarian, was struggling because the cost of reunification with the former East Germany had left a big hole in its budget.
Mr Von Kyaw admits that Germany's government "really sinned".
Well, "not a real sin" he adds - Germany just "flexibilised the schedules."
"But when a big country does that, how can you afterwards impose on smaller countries, including Greece, to obey the rules?" he concedes.
And that affected the way Greece viewed the consequences of breaking the rules.
"There was pressure," says Peter Doukas, "but not the sort of thing that is breathing down your neck.
"Everyone who could read the numbers could see that the numbers are off. Even if you allow for constructive accounting, or whatever."
In fact the Stability and Growth Pact was as good as dead by the time Mr Doukas took office in 2004.
So the lesson of history is that the real challenge for the new treaty will come if any of the big nations break the rules in the future.
Allan Little presents part two of Europe's Choice on BBC Radio 4 on Sunday, 5 February at 13:30 GMT.
You can listen again to whole series via the Radio 4 website or by downloading the Crossing Continents podcast.

Ετσι ήταν.Σκέψου αυτός σου λέει στα έδωσα όλα.Σου έδωσα νόμισμα ευρώ που δεν εδικαιούσο.Σου έδωσα Ολυμπιακούς που δεν άξιζες.Σου έδωσα αεροδρόμιο,μετρό,κέρδη στο χρηματιστήριο,σε διορίζω τώρα με stage να λύσεις το πρόβλημά σου διά παντος,δουλεύω για εσένα παντού και πάντα και εσύ ξαφνικά με λαμπαδιάζεις το Δεκέμβρη 2008 χωρίς λόγο και αιτία.Δεν το καταλαβαίνω αυτό.Ολα τα έδωσα για εσένανε μαντάμ και τώρα...

Κάπως έτσι βλέπει η μεταπολίτευση τον εαυτό της.

 

[Κώστας Λαδάκης]

Ναι, πριν τον Σημίτη ήταν θεοσεβούμενες παρθένες όλοι οι υφιστάμενοι στο δημόσιο, πήγαιναν κάθε Κυριακή στην εκκλησία και νήστευαν τη Σαρακοστή. Ρώτα κανέναν παλιό να σου πει π.χ. πώς γίνονταν οι δουλειές στη νύχτα τη δεκαετία του 1970 και του 1980 μπας και ξεστραβωθείς αδελφέ, γιατί ζεις στον κόσμο σου.

Πριν το Σημίτη, μίζα έπαιρναν οι Γενικοί Διευθυντές
και κάποιοι Διευθυντές .

Από τον Σημίτη, ξεκίνησαν να παίρνουν μίζα οι περισότεροι
σε ΟΛΕΣ τις βαθμίδες
του Δημοσίου, ακόμα και οι κλητήρες !
Αυτά έγραψα, αν δεν τα κατάλαβες.

Αυτά τα λένε όλοι οι ιδιοκτήτες κατασκευαστικών εταιρειών που έπαιρναν και
παίρνουν Δημόσια έργα .
Πριν το Σημίτη, λάδωναν τους Υπουργούς και τους Γενικούς Διευθυντές
και κάποιους Διευθυντές.

Από το Σημίτη , αναγκαζόντουσαν να λαδώσουν ακόμα και τον κλητήρα
που τους ειδοποιούσε ότι ήρθε η επιταγή για την πληρωμή του έργου.

Τα ξέρεις αυτά ; Αν δεν τα ξέρεις μάθε τα, και
να μη ζεις στα σύννεφα.

Επί Σημίτη η ΔΙΑΦΘΟΡΑ απλώθηκε από πάνω έως κάτω
στο Δημόσιο

 

[nickpie2008]

Δεκέμβριος 2005

και

How 'magic' made Greek debt disappear before it joined the euro

Greece distorted its government debt and budget deficit figures to comply with the Maastricht criteria and join the euro, Allan Little reports.

www.bbc.com

How 'magic' made Greek debt disappear before it joined the euro​

3 February 2012

Greece is at the heart of the ongoing eurozone crisis, but is past sleight of hand by Greek statisticians to blame for the country's current financial meltdown?
"We used to call him the magician, because he could make everything disappear.
"He made inflation disappear. And then he made the deficit disappear," recalls Greek economist Miranda Xafa.
In the 1990s Miranda Xafa was working for an investment house in London, watching from a distance, as her native Greece got ready for membership of the euro.
She knew - and advised her clients - that the country's economy was not ready, that the statistics its government was publishing did not reflect reality.
"I used to come to Athens from London, with clients of Salomon Brothers," she tells me.
"We always saw the head of the statistical agency of Greece, who compiled all the statistics on the debt, the deficit and so on."
He was "the magician" who made inflation and the deficit "disappear".
The new fiscal treaty that 25 of the 27 EU member states agreed to this week is meant to ensure that in future no country has a budget deficit of greater than 3% of GDP.
That same 3% rule was first enshrined in 1992, in the Maastricht Treaty, which led to the creation of the euro in the first place.
But some countries did not respect it. In the case of Greece, not even from the beginning. Greece cooked the books to join the euro in the first place.

Deception becomes transparent​

So how did this 'magic' work?
"Take the Greek state railway. It was losing a billion euros a year," Ms Xafa remembers.
"The Greek railway had more employees than passengers. A former minister, Stefanos Manos, had said publicly at the time that it would be cheaper to send everyone by taxi."
The authorities used a neat conjuring trick to make the problem vanish.
"The [railway] company would issue shares that the government would buy. So it was counted not as expenditure, but as a financial transaction."
And it did not appear on the budget balance sheet.
So Greece fulfilled the Maastricht criteria and was admitted to the eurozone on January 1, 2001 - but by 2004 the deception was becoming transparent.
That year a new, centre-right government was elected. Peter Doukas was appointed budget minister.
"I invited the senior staff of the ministry and asked them to give me details of the budget that had been passed the previous December, two-and-a-half months before we took office.
"I said 'don't worry about persecution or anything, just tell me the true story'."
The difference between the published deficit and the real one was huge.
"[The gap] was about 7% of GDP," Mr Doukas says.
"The budget said the deficit was 1.5%. The real shortfall was 8.3%."
So what did Mr Doukas do about it, given the eurozone's Maastricht treaty rule to keep budget deficits below 3% of GDP?
"I said it's an alarming situation and that we should start chopping down the budget," he recalls.
"But the answer I got at the time was 'listen, we are having the Olympic Games in a few months and we cannot upset the whole population and start having strikes and everything just before the Olympic Games'."

Germany 'sinned'​

Instead of reforming public finances, Greece borrowed and borrowed to meet the deficit. Banks queued up to lend.
The markets did not believe there was a risk of default because Greece's currency, the euro, was locked into that of Germany.

So Greece could borrow cheaply, at very low interest rates. It got credit on the same conditions, more or less, as Germany.
The so-called "spreads" - the differences in the rates at which sound and unsound economies could borrow - seemed to have disappeared.
Suddenly, in this one very narrow respect, every country was Germany.
That had not been part of the plan, says Dietrich Von Kyaw, who was Germany's ambassador to the EU in the 1990s.
"We didn't understand or foresee that due to this wonderfully successful-appearing monetary union everybody would get similar conditions as Germany would.
"Now we have these enormous spreads again as they were before monetary union," he says, "but for too long they didn't really come into play."
The markets failed to see the debt mountains that were accumulating. And they underestimated the risk.
Alongside the 3% of GDP budget deficit limit, eurozone members were also obliged to keep their overall debt to less than 60% of GDP.
They had signed up to a mechanism called the Stability and Growth Pact whereby governments could be fined for breaching the limits.
However, France and Germany broke the very rules that they had insisted on for everyone else.
Germany, the great European financial disciplinarian, was struggling because the cost of reunification with the former East Germany had left a big hole in its budget.
Mr Von Kyaw admits that Germany's government "really sinned".
Well, "not a real sin" he adds - Germany just "flexibilised the schedules."
"But when a big country does that, how can you afterwards impose on smaller countries, including Greece, to obey the rules?" he concedes.
And that affected the way Greece viewed the consequences of breaking the rules.
"There was pressure," says Peter Doukas, "but not the sort of thing that is breathing down your neck.
"Everyone who could read the numbers could see that the numbers are off. Even if you allow for constructive accounting, or whatever."
In fact the Stability and Growth Pact was as good as dead by the time Mr Doukas took office in 2004.
So the lesson of history is that the real challenge for the new treaty will come if any of the big nations break the rules in the future.
Allan Little presents part two of Europe's Choice on BBC Radio 4 on Sunday, 5 February at 13:30 GMT.
You can listen again to whole series via the Radio 4 website or by downloading the Crossing Continents podcast.

Περιμένω τα πλαστά πλαστα πλαστα πλαστα στοιχεία και μάλιστα τα επίσημα που υποστηρίζει και ο Δούκας
ΥΓ Και τελικά τι να γινόταν να μας πει καποιος

 

[nickpie2008]

Ετσι ήταν.Σκέψου αυτός σου λέει στα έδωσα όλα.Σου έδωσα νόμισμα ευρώ που δεν εδικαιούσο.Σου έδωσα Ολυμπιακούς που δεν άξιζες.Σου έδωσα αεροδρόμιο,μετρό,κέρδη στο χρηματιστήριο,σε διορίζω τώρα με stage να λύσεις το πρόβλημά σου διά παντος,δουλεύω για εσένα παντού και πάντα και εσύ ξαφνικά με λαμπαδιάζεις το Δεκέμβρη 2008 χωρίς λόγο και αιτία.Δεν το καταλαβαίνω αυτό.Ολα τα έδωσα για εσένανε μαντάμ και τώρα...

Κάπως έτσι βλέπει η μεταπολίτευση τον εαυτό της.

Μιας και αναφέρει το stage που φυσικά είναι ότι πιο κατάπτυστο υπήρξε οι εποχικοί δηλαδή πχ πυροσβέστες να μονιμοποιηθουν όπως συμβαίνει τώρα?

 

[Κώστας Λαδάκης]

Περιμένω τα πλαστά στοιχεία και μάλιστα τα επίσημα που υποστηρίζει και ο Δούκας
ΥΓ Και τελικά τι να γινόταν να μας πει καποιος

Δεν διάβασες το άρθρο ;

How 'magic' made Greek debt disappear before it joined the euro

Greece distorted its government debt and budget deficit figures to comply with the Maastricht criteria and join the euro, Allan Little reports.

www.bbc.com

How 'magic' made Greek debt disappear before it joined the euro​

3 February 2012

Βάλε το google translate

όσο και να κα΄νεις προπαγάνδα για τον ολετήρα

δεν μπορείς να συγκαλύψεις τις ζημιές που έκανε .

Ο χειρότερος πλην της Κούλας Πορδηπουργός

Ο Αρσένης ο Άκης και ο Σημίτης πηγαίνουν ...

Τα καλύτερα ανέκδοτα, αστείες ατάκες, αστεία status, αστείες εικόνες και αστεία βίντεο!

www.sapsalis.gr

Ο Αρσένης ο Άκης και ο Σημίτης πηγαίνουν στον Θεό. Ο Θεός τους λέει:
- Μέσα σε αυτή την αίθουσα υπάρχουν 100 καναρίνια από τα οποία το ένα μόνο είναι αρσενικό. Όποιος το βρει θα πάει στον παράδεισο.
Mπαίνει πρώτος ο Αρσένης και μετά από λίγο βγαίνει με θηλυκό.
Μπαίνει ο Άκης, και αυτός βγαίνει με θηλυκό.
Τέλος πάει και ο Σημίτης. Μετά από λίγο βγαίνει με χαμόγελο, κρατώντας το αρσενικό.
- Πως τον βρήκες; τον ρωτάει ο Θεός
- Εε μπήκα μέσα και τους είπα πως είμαι ο Σημίτης, και αυτός εδώ μου είπε: Στα τέτοια μου!

Πηγή: www.sapsalis.gr

 

[Κώστας Λαδάκης]

 

[nickpie2008]

Δεν διάβασες το άρθρο ;

How 'magic' made Greek debt disappear before it joined the euro

Greece distorted its government debt and budget deficit figures to comply with the Maastricht criteria and join the euro, Allan Little reports.

www.bbc.com

How 'magic' made Greek debt disappear before it joined the euro​

3 February 2012

Βάλε το google translate

όσο και να κα΄νεις προπαγάνδα για τον ολετήρα

δεν μπορείς να συγκαλύψεις τις ζημιές που έκανε .

Ο χειρότερος πλην της Κούλας Πορδηπουργός

Ο Αρσένης ο Άκης και ο Σημίτης πηγαίνουν ...

Τα καλύτερα ανέκδοτα, αστείες ατάκες, αστεία status, αστείες εικόνες και αστεία βίντεο!

www.sapsalis.gr

Ο Αρσένης ο Άκης και ο Σημίτης πηγαίνουν στον Θεό. Ο Θεός τους λέει:
- Μέσα σε αυτή την αίθουσα υπάρχουν 100 καναρίνια από τα οποία το ένα μόνο είναι αρσενικό. Όποιος το βρει θα πάει στον παράδεισο.
Mπαίνει πρώτος ο Αρσένης και μετά από λίγο βγαίνει με θηλυκό.
Μπαίνει ο Άκης, και αυτός βγαίνει με θηλυκό.
Τέλος πάει και ο Σημίτης. Μετά από λίγο βγαίνει με χαμόγελο, κρατώντας το αρσενικό.
- Πως τον βρήκες; τον ρωτάει ο Θεός
- Εε μπήκα μέσα και τους είπα πως είμαι ο Σημίτης, και αυτός εδώ μου είπε: Στα τέτοια μου!

Πηγή: www.sapsalis.gr

Ακριβως επειδη ταδιαβασα τα ξαναζητησα
Όταν θα βρεις συγκεκριμένα στοιχεία για τα πλαστά στοιχεία ξαναγραψε
Δηλωσεις της Ξαφα ή ενος δημοσιογραφου ειναι ο λογος καποιου οχι στοιχεια
Όλα τα άλλα είναι αριστεριστικες απόψεις να χαμε να λεγαμε
Τα στοιχεία είναι δημοσιευμένα από τις επίσημες αρχές
Και όπως χρησιμοποιήθηκαν από την Ελλάδα χρησιμοππιηθηκαν και από τις άλλες χώρες.
Αυτούς δείκτες ήθελαν αυτός ικανοποίησαν όλες καλώς ή κακως